Treaty of Copenhagen - History

Treaty of Copenhagen - History

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The Treaty of Copenhagen was signed in June 1660, bringing an end to the war between Sweden and Denmark. The agreement established the boundaries between Sweden, Norway and Denmark. Those boundaries have endured until today.

Treaty of the Danish West Indies

The Treaty of the Danish West Indies, officially the Convention between the United States and Denmark for cession of the Danish West Indies, was a 1916 treaty transferring sovereignty of the Virgin Islands in the Danish West Indies from Denmark to the United States in exchange for a sum of US$25,000,000 in gold ($595 million in 2021). It is one of the most recent permanent expansions of United States territory. [note 1]

  • Denmark
  • United States

The Fourteen Points  

In a speech to Congress in January 1918, Wilson laid out his idealistic vision for the post-war world. In addition to specific territorial settlements based on an Entente victory, Wilson’s so-called Fourteen Points emphasized the need for national self-determination for Europe’s different ethnic populations. Wilson also proposed the founding of a “general association of nations” that would mediate international disputes and foster cooperation between different nations in the hopes of preventing war on such a large scale in the future. This organization eventually became known as the League of Nations.

Wilson’s Fourteen Points are summarized below:

1. Diplomacy should be public, with no secret treaties.

2. All nations should enjoy free navigation of the seas.

3. Free trade should exist among all nations, putting an end to economic barriers between countries.

4. All countries should reduce arms in the name of public safety.

5. Fair and impartial rulings in colonial claims.

6. Restore Russian territories and freedom.

7. Belgium should be restored to independence.

8. Alsace-Lorraine should be returned to France and France should be fully liberated.

9. Italy’s frontiers should be drawn along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

10. People living in Austria-Hungary should be granted self-determination.

11. The Balkan states should also be guaranteed self-determination and independence.

12. Turks and those under Turkish rule should be granted self-determination.

13. An independent Poland should be created.

14. A general association of nations must be formed to mediate international disputes.

When German leaders signed the armistice ending hostilities in World War I on November 11, 1918, they believed this vision articulated by Wilson would form the basis for any future peace treaty. This would not prove to be the case.

Copenhagen History

Copenhagen's foundation dates back to 1167 when Bishop Absalon built a bastion on the island of Slotsholmen, today the site of Christiansborg Palace and the Danish parliament.

Following the signing of a treaty that began the Kalmar Union among Denmark, Norway and Sweden, the city became the capital of Denmark in 1416 when Eric of Pomerania moved his seat to Copenhagen Castle. As a result, the city boomed and many of Copenhagen's most impressive buildings were constructed in the years that followed, in particular during the reign of Christian IV (1588-1648). Along with the Børsen, the Rundetårn and the Palace of Rosenborg, Christian IV was also responsible for Copenhagen's canal network and for the development of Christianshavn.

Like most European nations in the 18th century, Copenhagen's growth was curtailed by a series of military misadventures, with several sieges, an outbreak of plague and two terrible fires causing much damage.

After wars with the British in the early part of the 19th century, Copenhagen bounced back and flourished, ushering a period of intense cultural creativity known as the Danish Golden Age. In the 20th century, with Denmark remained neutral in WW1, Copenhagen continued to prosper. But it was not so fortunate during WWII when German troops occupied the city from 1 April 1940 to 4 May 1945. After the war, Copenhagen and its surround areas became Denmark's manufacturing hub.

Today, Copenhagen is one of the world's most stylish cities and is famous for its cutting-edge design and vibrant gastronomic scene.


On 8 June 1959 Greece requested an association agreement with the European Community under Article 238. Turkey followed six weeks later. 35 35 S. Ceylanoglu, Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, Griechenland und die Türkei Die Assoziationsabkommen im Vergleich, 1959–1963 (Nomos, 2004) Feld, above, n. 14, at 225–226 Cohen, above, n. 14, at 529–531. Greece became the first associate of the European Community when the Athens agreement was signed on 9 July 1961 and entered into force on 1 November 1962. 36 36 I.S. Tsalicoglou, Negotiating for Entry: The Accession of Greece to the European Community (Dartmouth, 1996), 9–21 S. Verney, ‘Greece and the European Community’, in K. Featherstone and D.K. Katsoudas (eds.), Political Change in Greece: Before and After the Colonels (Croom Helm, 1987), 253–270 V. Coufoudakis, ‘Greek Foreign Policy, 1945–1985: Seeking Independence in an Interdependent World—Problems and Prospects’, in ibid., 230–252 S. Verney, ‘An exceptional case? Party and popular Euroscepticism in Greece, 1959–2009’ (2011) 16 South European Society and Politics, 51–79 S. Verney, ‘The Greek Association with the European Community: A Strategy of State’, in A.C. Pinto and N.S. Teixeira (eds.), Southern Europe and the Making of the European Union, 1945–1980s (Columbia University Press, 2002), 109–156. Turkey was the second the Ankara agreement was signed on 12 September 1963 and entered into force on 1 December 1964. 37 37 S. Ilkin, ‘A Short History of Turkey's Association with the European Community’, in A. Evin and G. Denton (eds.), Turkey and the European Community (Leske und Budrich, 1990), 35–50 R. Bourguignon, ‘A History of the Association Agreement between Turkey and the European Community, in: ibid., 51–64 H. Arikan, Turkey and the EU An Awkward Candidate for EU membership? (Ashgate, 2003), 47–76 S. Verney, ‘National Identity and political change on Turkey's road to EU membership’ (2007) 9(3) Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, 213–221 S. Verney, ‘National Identity and Political Change on Turkey's Road to EU Membership’, in S. Verney and K. Ifantis, Turkey's Road to European Union Membership: National Identity and Political Change (Routledge, 2009), 1–9.

Both agreements provided that membership was a tentative long-term aim of the association. According to Article 72 of the Athens Agreement, “as soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by Greece of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of Greece to the Community”. 38 38 ‘Agreement creating an association between the European Economic Community and Greece’, Official Journal of the European Communities, no. 26 of 18.02.1963. The preamble to the agreement reinforced this by saying that “the support given by the European Economic Community to the efforts of the Greek people to improve their standard of living will facilitate the accession of Greece to the Community at a later date”. Article 28 and the preamble of the Ankara Agreement provided, mutatis mutandis, the same. 39 39 EEC-Turkey Association Agreement (1963) Official Journal of the European Communities, no. 217 of 29.12.1964. These formulations, to be sure, were cautious membership was a possibility, not a certainty, in a distant, not a near, future—at least 17 years would pass before an assessment could be made of whether negotiations could begin—following new negotiations. Yet they were significant all the same: the Council, the European Parliament and the national parliaments of the six Member States apparently saw no obstacles to the prospect of membership on account of the political systems in Turkey and Greece. This, as we shall see in the next paragraph, was entirely different when Spain and Portugal requested association with a view to membership in 1962.

Negotiations with Greece and Turkey had been complicated and slow for a number of reasons, including the fact that precedent on Article 238 was going to be set and that the precise competences of the Council and the Commission were unclear and contested. 40 40 Ceylanoglu, above, n. 35, at 124–164. But there was no effort to deny Greece and Turkey negotiations on an association agreement, or the prospect of possible membership, on account of their political systems. Greece and Turkey were, of course, important to the European Community and its members for a variety of reasons, including their strategic importance to NATO, of which the Six as well as Turkey and Greece were members, in one of the most perilous periods in the Cold War—the Berlin Wall was constructed in 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis was in 1962. 41 41 Ibid., at 171–176 J.G. Hershberg, ‘The Cuban Missile Crisis’, in M.P. Leffner and O.A. Westad, The Cambridge History of the Cold War Volume 2: Crises and Détente (Cambridge University Press, 2011), 65–87. But there is no evidence that the European Community and national parliaments found the Turkish and Greek political systems unacceptable and were unprepared to conclude an association agreement with a view to membership had not Cold War or other interests come into play.

Unlike Spain and Portugal, Greece and Turkey had been members of the Council of Europe since 1949 and 1950, respectively. 42 42 Portugal became the 19th Member State of the Council of Europe on 22 September 1976 Spain became the 20th Member State of the Council of Europe on 24 November 1977. Its Statute provided, in Article 3, that every member “must accept the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms”. Turkey had seen a peaceful transition from authoritarianism to multiparty democracy in 1946 and an equally peaceful alternation of power after the elections in 1950. 43 43 E.J. Zűrcher, Turkey A Modern History (I.B. Tauris, 2004), 215–263 S.J. Shaw and E.K. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey Volume II: Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808–1975 (Cambridge University Press, 1977), 402–429 F. Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey (Routledge, 1993), 102–147. On 27 May 1960 there had been a military coup d'état, on account of which the European Community delayed the start of negotiations on the association agreement, but in 1961 a new constitution was adopted after a referendum, and elections were held again that were free and fair. The new constitution provided for additional checks and balances, including the establishment of a constitutional court, and made the media and the universities independent. Greece also had peaceful elections after the civil war ended in 1949, but its democracy was unstable with new elections being held almost every year in the 1950s. 44 44 J.S. Koliopoulos and T.M. Veremis, Modern Greece: A History Since 1821 (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 127–152) R. Clogg, A Short History of Modern Greece (Cambridge University Press, 1986), 166–199 D.C. Close, Greece Since 1945: Politics, Economy and Society (Longman, 2002), 83–110.

On the face of it, Turkey and Greece were democracies, unlike Spain and Portugal. The Greek government had presented the rationale for its inclusion in the European Free Trade Area in 1957 as “the defence of the European and more specifically of the democratic way of life in the whole area” of south-eastern Europe. 45 45 Quoted in Verney, ‘The Greek Association with the European Community’, above, n. 36, at 145. In this sense, Turkey and Greece were no litmus test of whether the European Community and national parliaments held that prospective members needed to satisfy political conditions. Reality was less convincing. Turkey saw a return to authoritarian politics in the mid-1950s with government control of the media and universities (which were, however, reversed with the new constitution in 1961), restrictions on political meetings during elections, and a pogrom against Greek citizens. 46 46 Zűrcher, above, n. 43, at 229–232. Greece had a lack of press freedom, heavy US involvement in politics and the army, a prevalence of clientelism which undermined the functioning of democracy, and the 1961 elections were rigged. 47 47 Verney, ‘The Greek Association with the European Community’, above, n. 36, at 116–118 Koliopoulos and Veremis, above, n. 44, at 132–138. Such facts are insufficient, however, to conclude that the Community was agnostic about the political nature of its possible future members. Such a conclusion would require a test to separate real from (partly) cosmetic democracies which can be used, without anachronism, with respect to candidates as well as then members.

Publication Type

The UN Conference on Climate Change in Copenhagen presents a critical opportunity to strengthen the international response to global climate change. The aim in Copenhagen should be a comprehensive political agreement that puts countries on a clear path to concluding a legally binding agreement in 2010. This interim agreement should deliver both immediate action and the broad architecture of a future treaty, including:

  • Ambitious political commitments for mid-term action by all major economies: economy-wide emission reduction targets for developed countries, and quantified mitigation actions by major developing countries
  • A “prompt start” on adaptation, forestry, technology and capacity-building activities and support in developing countries
  • The core elements of a legally binding agreement to be finalized over the coming year, including: a framework for verifiable mitigation commitments by all major economies new arrangements for sustained mitigation and adaptation support to developing countries and a system to verify countries’ actions and support and,
  • A clear mandate to conclude negotiations on a legally binding agreement at COP 16 in December 2010.

The Ultimate Goal: A Ratifiable Treaty

Negotiations are proceeding on parallel tracks under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which includes the United States, and under the UNFCCC’s Kyoto Protocol, which does not. The ultimate outcome could take many forms the most coherent would be a single comprehensive agreement under the UNFCCC.

Whatever its particular form, it is important that this final outcome be legally binding. Countries will deliver their strongest possible efforts only if they are confident that their major counterparts and competitors are as well. This confidence is best instilled and maintained through mutual and verifiable commitments. While the United States and other countries are moving to strengthen their domestic climate efforts, and most will be ready to announce political commitments in Copenhagen, not all are prepared to take on binding legal commitments. An interim agreement in Copenhagen would significantly advance the global climate effort by settling fundamental legal and design issues so that governments can then negotiate specific commitments in a ratifiable agreement post-Copenhagen.

In Copenhagen: A Strong Framework Agreement

Much of the focus in Copenhagen will be on the political commitments announced by governments on their domestic climate efforts, and on the decisions and “prompt-start” finance needed to quickly operationalize new support for developing countries. It is critical that the Copenhagen agreement also begin to establish the legal and institutional framework for converting these interim pledges and
decisions into an effective treaty with legally binding commitments. It should go as far as possible to define:

Ambitious Goals. The agreement should recognize the imperative of limiting warming to 2 degrees Celsius and set an aspirational goal of reducing global emissions at least 50 percent by 2050.

A Framework for Mitigation Commitments. The agreement should clearly define the nature of mitigation commitments and how they are to be reflected in a final agreement (e.g., through “appendices” or “schedules”). Consistent with the UNFCCC’s principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities,” it should allow varying forms and levels of commitments depending on national circumstance:

  • Absolute economy-wide emission targets for all developed countries and
  • A wider range of quantifiable policy-based commitments for major developing countries (e.g., sectoral emission targets, energy efficiency standards, renewable energy targets, sustainable forestry goals).

The agreement should launch and support a process, such as a “registry” process, to elaborate country-specific commitments for the major developing countries and to align support for them. It also should go as far as possible in defining implementation and accounting rules.

Support for Developing Countries. The agreement should broadly establish the mechanisms, sources, and levels of support to be provided in a final agreement for adaptation, capacity building, forestry and technology deployment in developing countries. It should: set initial funding levels and a timetable for periodic replenishment set criteria to determine countries’ contributions to and/or eligibility for support rely on, rather than replicate, existing multilateral financial mechanisms provide for stronger developing country representation in the governance of climate finance and, recognize the full range of multilateral and bilateral funding sources.

A Sound System of Verification. The agreement should establish basic terms for the measurement, reporting and verification of countries’ mitigation actions, and of support for developing country efforts, as called for in the Bali Action Plan. Building on existing reporting and review requirements under the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol, it should require annual emissions inventories by all major-emitting countries (with a phase-in period and support for developing countries) national verification of countries’ mitigation commitments and, regular implementation reports subject to international review. The review process should culminate in a clear determination of whether or not a country is complying with its commitments, with facilitative remedies in cases of non-compliance.

Treaty of Copenhagen - History

World leaders struck a new political accord to address climate change at the 2009 U.N. Climate Summit in Copenhagen, Denmark. The accord provided for explicit emission pledges by all major economies – including, for the first time, China and other major developing countries – but charted no clear path toward a treaty with binding commitments.

The Copenhagen conference culminated two years of intense negotiations launched with the 2007 Bali Action Plan and drew a level of political attention well beyond that of any previous climate meeting. By its closing days, the summit had drawn well over 100 heads of state and government.

The basic terms of the Copenhagen Accord were brokered directly by a handful of key country leaders on the final day of the conference. It took nearly another full day of tense negotiations to arrive at a procedural compromise allowing the leaders’ deal to be formalized over the bitter objections of a few governments.

Key elements include: an aspirational goal of limiting global temperature increase to 2 degrees Celsius a process for countries to enter their specific mitigation pledges by January 31, 2010 broad terms for the reporting and verification of countries’ actions a commitment by developed countries for $30 billion in 2010-2012 to help developing countries and a goal for mobilizing $100 billion a year in public and private finance by 2020. The accord also called for the establishment of a new Green Climate Fund.

Read the full C2ES summary of the outcome of COP 15 below.

More on COP 15 in Copenhagen:

The Copenhagen Accord provided for explicit emission pledges by all major economies – including, for the first time, China and other major developing countries – but no clear path toward a binding treaty.


15th Session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 15) December 7-18, 2009 Copenhagen, Denmark

A new political accord struck by world leaders at the U.N. Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen provides for explicit emission pledges by all the major economies – including, for the first time, China and other major developing countries – but charts no clear path toward a treaty with binding commitments.

The basic terms of the Copenhagen Accord were brokered directly by President Obama and a handful of key developing country leaders on the final day of the conference, capping two weeks of harsh rhetoric and pitched procedural battles that made the prospect of any agreement highly uncertain. It then took nearly another full day of tense negotiations to arrive at a procedural compromise allowing the leaders’ deal to be formalized over the bitter objections of a few governments.

In the end, parties adopted parallel decisions under the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol that “take note” of the political accord and open the way for governments to individually sign on. In separate decisions, parties extended Ad Hoc Working Groups under both the Convention and the Protocol to continue negotiating toward a fuller agreement in late 2010 in Mexico. The unusual set of outcomes leaves uncertainty, however, about the formal standing of the Copenhagen Accord under the U.N. climate process and about the nature of any future agreement. The aim of a “legally binding instrument,” which appeared part of the deal when President Obama first announced it, was later stripped out.

Key elements of the Copenhagen Accord include: an aspirational goal of limiting global temperature increase to 2 degrees Celsius a process for countries to enter their specific mitigation pledges by January 31, 2010 broad terms for the reporting and verification of countries’ actions a collective commitment by developed countries for $30 billion in “new and additional” resources in 2010-2012 to help developing countries reduce emissions, preserve forests, and adapt to climate change and a goal of mobilizing $100 billion a year in public and private finance by 2020 to address developing county needs. The accord also calls for the establishment of a Copenhagen Green Climate Fund, a High-Level Panel to examine ways of meeting the 2020 finance goal, a new Technology Mechanism, and a mechanism to channel incentives for reduced deforestation. (See details below).

The Copenhagen conference culminated two years of intense negotiations launched with the 2007 Bali Action Plan. Known formally as the Fifteenth Session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 15) and the Fifth Session of the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 5), the gathering drew a level of political attention well beyond that of any previous climate meeting. Ministers, who ordinarily attend only the final days of the annual COP, arrived the first week hoping to unlock the stalled talks. By its closing days, the summit had drawn well over 100 heads of state and government.

Yet from its opening the conference was marked by bitter divisions, confusion, and setbacks. The Danish government, which had invested extraordinary effort to ensure Copenhagen’s success, found itself undermined from the start by the “leak” of a draft text opposed by developing countries. Though President Obama and other leaders had indicated weeks earlier that they foresaw only a political agreement, the talks were bottled up for days by Tuvalu’s adamant but unsuccessful demand for immediate consideration of a legally binding outcome. A new draft political agreement finally tabled late in the first week was roundly rejected by developed countries. Attempts to break the impasse by referring core issues to smaller groups of countries, rather than continuing to negotiate all issues with all parties, were repeatedly rebuffed by many developing countries, who insisted on full “transparency” and “inclusiveness.”

Those issues continued to dominate in a bitter closing debate as Venezuela, Sudan, Nicaragua, Bolivia and a few others fought to block the leaders’ agreement because most parties were outside the room when it was negotiated. Venezuela declared the agreement a “coup d’etat against the United Nations,” and Sudan likened its effects on poor nations to those of the Holocaust, prompting a round of angry demands that the comment be withdrawn. Though the accord ultimately won formal recognition despite the lack of full consensus, the episode left many privately questioning the prospects for significant further progress within a fully global, procedurally bound U.N. process.

Other dramas in Copenhagen included open squabbling among the typically unified developing country Group of 77, and the struggle between the issue’s two lead protagonists – the United States and China. The two sparred before the press and remained deadlocked behind closed doors until nearly the end. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who arrived ahead of President Obama, upped the pressure by declaring U.S. support for the goal of $100 billion a year for developing countries, an offer that many African and small-island countries did not want to let slip by. It was only then that Chinese Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei appeared to concede on U.S. demands that its actions be open to some form of international scrutiny.

President Obama closed the deal the next day in a meeting with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula, and South African President Jacob Zuma. He then announced the tentative agreement to the press and headed home, leaving other leaders to consider the terms, and weary negotiators to devise the final procedural maneuvers.

Copenhagen Accord

The Copenhagen Accord is a political (as opposed to legal) agreement of a novel form. Formal decisions under the U.N. climate process are typically taken by consensus. As some parties opposed the accord, the decision entering it into the conference’s proceedings is not technically an acceptance of its substantive content by the Conference of the Parties (or by the parallel Meeting of the Parties under Kyoto). Rather, the decisions by the two bodies only “take note” of the attached accord. Individual countries, in all likelihood a strong majority of the Convention’s 192 parties, will affix their names to the accord in the coming weeks. The accord declares itself “operational immediately,” although many of its provisions will require further elaboration (in some cases explicitly, and in other cases presumably, by the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties). The timeline for doing so is not specified.

In substance, the accord speaks to all of the core elements of the Bali Action Plan: a long-term goal mitigation adaptation finance technology forests and measurement, reporting and verification.

Long-Term Goal

The agreement “recogniz[es] the scientific view that the increase in global temperature should be below 2 degrees Celsius.” It also calls for a review of the accord by 2015, including a consideration of strengthening the long-term goal “in relation to temperature rises of 1.5 degrees Celsius.”


Under the accord, Annex I (developed) countries “commit to implement” economy-wide emissions targets for 2020, and non-Annex I (developing) countries “will implement mitigation actions.” (Least developed and small island countries “may undertake actions voluntarily and on the basis of support.”)

The developed country targets and an initial set of developing country actions are to be entered into two appendices by January 31, 2010. It is widely expected, although not specified in the accord, that the targets and actions entered will be consistent with those floated by governments in the run-up to Copenhagen. Additional developing country actions can be added to the appendix on an ongoing basis. Actions for which developing countries are seeking support are to be recorded in a registry, and those receiving support will later be listed in the developing country appendix.

Measurement, Reporting and Verification (MRV)

The emission targets of Annex I countries, and their delivery of finance for developing countries, will be MRV’d “in accordance with existing and any further guidelines” from the COP. These guidelines are to ensure “rigorous, robust and transparent” accounting of both targets and finance.

Actions by developing countries “will be subject to their domestic” MRV, with the results reported in biennial national communications. The information reported will be subject to “international consultation and analysis under clearly defined guidelines that will ensure that national sovereignty is respected.” Developing country actions receiving international support will be subject to international MRV under guidelines adopted by the COP.


Developed countries “shall provide adequate, predictable and sustainable” finance, technology and capacity-building to support the implementation of adaptation actions in developing countries.


The accord declares the “immediate establishment of a mechanism…to enable the mobilization of financial resources from developed countries” to support efforts to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and to enhance forest sinks.


“Scaled up, new and additional, predictable and adequate funding” is to be provided to developing countries to support mitigation efforts (including forest-related), adaptation, technology development and transfer, and capacity-building. For the period 2010-2012, developed countries have a “collective commitment” to provide “new and additional resources…approaching USD 30 billion.” Developed countries also commit to a goal of jointly mobilizing $100 billion a year by 2020, “in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation.” The long-term finance is to be a mix of public (bilateral and multilateral) and private resources.

The accord calls for a new Copenhagen Green Climate Fund as one channel for delivering finance and a High Level Panel “to study the contribution of the potential sources of revenue” toward the long-term funding goal.


The agreement establishes a new Technology Mechanism to accelerate technology development and transfer for both adaptation and mitigation.

Relation to UNFCCC and Kyoto – The accord endorses two parallel decisions under the Convention and the Protocol (see below) extending the two formal negotiating tracks that existed prior to Copenhagen. Those decisions, however, do not cross-reference the accord. Thus, while some parties will likely look to those negotiating processes to elaborate and fully operationalize the accord, no formal link was established.

Ad Hoc Working Group under the Convention

Two years ago in Bali, the COP launched the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA) as the forum for negotiating the “agreed outcome” to be adopted in Copenhagen. A set of decisions addressing the core elements of the Bali Action Plan, and a core decision tying them together, were not completed. While parties made modest progress in some areas, many of the draft texts remain heavily bracketed.

The COP adopted a decision forwarding the texts and extending the mandate of the AWG-LCA “with a view to presenting the outcome of its work…for adoption” next year at COP 16. A draft decision circulated at the time President Obama announced the tentative deal described the intended outcome next year as “a legally binding instrument.” However, the phrase did not appear in the text presented at the closing plenary. A number of countries including the United States argued for is reinsertion, but were opposed by others including India and Saudi Arabia.

Ad Hoc Working Group under the Protocol

A parallel Ad Hoc Working Group, the AWG-KP, was established under the Kyoto Protocol in 2005 to consider post-2012 emission targets for developed countries that are party to Kyoto. As with the AWG-LCA, its work remained uncompleted. The Kyoto parties adopted a decision forwarding the incomplete texts and calling on the AWG-KP to complete its work for adoption next year at the meeting of the Kyoto parties to be held in parallel with COP 16.


Jay&rsquos Treaty, officially titled &ldquoTreaty of Amity Commerce and Navigation, between His Britannic Majesty and The United States of America,&rdquo was negotiated by Supreme Court Chief Justice John Jay and signed between the United States and Great Britain on November 19, 1794. Tensions between the two countries had increased since the end of the Revolutionary War over British military posts still located in America's northwestern territory and British interference with American trade and shipping. Jay was only partially successful in getting Britain to meet America's demands and opposition to the treaty in the United States was intense. Although President George Washington was disappointed with the treaty&rsquos provisions, he felt it was the best hope to avert war with Great Britain and submitted it to the Senate for approval. Jay&rsquos Treaty passed the Senate on June 24, 1795, by a vote of 20 to 10, exactly the two-thirds required for approval.

Treaty of Greeneville (1795)

On August 20, 1794, an American army commanded by General Anthony Wayne defeated an American Indian force led by Blue Jacket of the Shawnee at the Battle of Fallen Timbers. This victory, and the failure of the commandant of the British fort at modern-day Maumee, convinced American Indians living along the Maumee River to sue for peace. In January 1795, representatives from the various tribes began meeting with Wayne at Greene Ville. The Anglo-American settlers and American Indians spent the next eight months negotiating a treaty that became known as the Treaty of Greeneville.

On August 3, 1795, leaders of the Wyandot, Delaware, Shawnee, Ottawa, Miami, Eel River, Wea, Chippewa, Potawatomi, Kickapoo, Piankashaw, and Kaskaskia nations formally signed the treaty. The American Indians who became signatories agreed to relinquish all claims to land south and east of a boundary that began roughly at the mouth of the Cuyahoga River. It ran southward to Fort Laurens and then turned westward to Fort Loramie and Fort Recovery. It then turned southward to the Ohio River. The Indians, however, could still hunt on the land that they ceded. The whites agreed to relinquish their claims to land north and west of the line, although the American Indians permitted the Americans to establish several trading posts in their territory. The United States also provided the Indians with $20,000 worth of goods for signing the treaty. The American government also agreed to give Ohio's American Indian signatories $9,500 every year in goods. The American Indians were to decide how the goods would be divided among them.

Some American Indians refused to honor the agreement. White settlers continued to move onto the contested land. Violence continued between these two peoples. American Indian leaders like Tecumseh and the Prophet would emerge in the early 1800s to carry on the American Indian struggle to regain their lost land.

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of 1991

Presidents George H. W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev sign START, 31 July 1991.

The George Bush Presidential Library and Museum

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) was signed on July 31, 1991 by President George H.W. Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. The treaty limited the number of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and nuclear warheads either country could possess. When fully implemented, the treaty resulted in the removal of about 80 percent of all strategic nuclear weapons then in existence. Proposed by President Reagan, it was renamed START I after negotiations began on the second START treaty.

The treaty directly led to the deactivation and destruction of all 450 Minuteman II Launch Facilities (LFs) and 45 associated Launch Control Facilities (LCFs) with the exception of Launch Facility (Missile Silo) Delta-09 and Launch Control Facility Delta-01. Due to language in the treaty, these sites were preserved for historical interpretive purposes and would eventually become Minuteman Missile National Historic Site.

The treaty restricted the United States to approximately 8,556 nuclear warheads and the Soviet Union to approximately 6,449 nuclear warheads. Weapons in excess of the agreed upon number would be disarmed and Launch Facilities destroyed. Congress ratified the START Treaty in October 1992. The signing of the START Treaty concluded disarmament talks that had begun almost a decade earlier in the early 1980s. The START Treaty established limits on all three parts of the American nuclear triad. It limited the number of ICBMs and their Launch Facilities (Missile Silos) and warheads Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), their launchers and warheads and heavy bombers and their weapons.

A Plan For Peace–The Minuteman II Stands Down

In the United States, the START treaty coincided with growing Air Force disenchantment with the escalating costs associated with repairing and maintaining the older Minuteman II system. Rather than upgrade Minuteman II facilities to Minuteman III technologies, the Pentagon decided to deactivate the entire Minuteman II force to help comply with provisions of the arms-reduction treaty. On September 27, 1991 President George H.W. Bush announced on national television a dramatic "plan for peace," designed to reduce the tensions of the nuclear age. As one component of his plan, he called for "the withdrawal from alert within seventy-two hours, of all 450 Minuteman II intercontinental ballistic missiles."

After the signing of the START Treaty and the stand down ordered by President Bush, the Air Force began the deactivation of Minuteman II ICBM sites, including the 150 Minuteman II LFs and fifteen LCFs at Ellsworth Air Force Base in South Dakota. Additional Minuteman II installations were associated with Strategic Air Command (SAC) bases at Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana and Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri. At Whiteman Air Force Base, all 150 of its Minuteman II LFs were imploded by 1997, but the underground Launch Control Center (LCC), Oscar-01, located on base, was retained for public interpretation. The 150 Minuteman II sites at Malmstrom Air Force Base were converted to Minuteman III systems and the necessary missiles were transferred from the Grand Forks Minuteman III installation, which was then deactivated.

Implosions Instead of Explosions–Dismantling The Minuteman II System

The landmark START Treaty governed the removal of the Minuteman II missiles and the destruction of the LFs. LF elimination began with the opening of the silo door. From this point forward, the process of deactivating the LF took less than 180 days. A series of agreements between the United States and the former Soviet Union allowed the weapons-grade nuclear material from the warheads to be either used for fuel in nuclear reactors or disposed of along with other high-level radioactive waste. Hazardous materials were then removed from the site and contractors salvaged steel and other equipment.

Destruction of the silos could be accomplished either by implosion to at least six meters (twenty feet) below ground level or by excavating the former silo to a depth of at least eight meters (twenty-six feet). The silo site then had to remain open for ninety days to allow Soviet satellites time to verify that the removal complied with treaty provisions. At the end of this time period the process was considered complete. The Minuteman II, an icon of the Cold War era, was now history.

A Launch Facility (Missile Silo) is imploded to comply with the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

Watch the video: Η Ιστορία της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης (May 2022).